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THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND
YOUNG PEOPLE: CATHOLIC AND
CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS OF
RESPONSIBLE FREEDOM
ANGELA C. CARMELLA *
Abstract: The religion clauses of the U.S. Constitution and the
Declaration on Religious Freedom of the Second Vatican Council offer
visions of "responsible freedom"—that is, freedom tempered by the
moral claims of others and by the laws necessary to the life of the
society. Both visions contain a legitimate role for the state in the
protection of children, even where this requires scrutiny by the state of
the decisions of religious institutions. In the context of the sexual abuse
of minors by Roman Catholic clergy, this Article argues that the state's
role necessarily entails some limits on the Church's autonomy through
the imposition of tort liability, and necessarily calls for church-state
cooperation on the common goal of protecting minors. Yet in both
constitutional and conciliar visions of responsible freedom, the Church
has sufficient room for its own internal reforms, and must not grow
dependent upon the state as it pursues self-correction. The Church
should use its freedom for vigorous new life, neither demanding from
the state total deference to its internal decisions nor relinquishing to
the state the task of moral renewal and institutional reform.
For nearly two decades, the public has grown increasingly aware
of irresponsible decisions made by Catholic leadership regarding
priests accused of sexual abuse of children and young people, particu-
larly the practice of reassigning abusive priests who subsequently
harmed other minors. The real magnitude of the tragedy became
clear only in 2002, with court-ordered releases of thousands of pages
of internal church documents and the voluntary disclosure of infor-
mation by dioceses throughout the country. One revelation after an-
other of sexual abuse confirmed yet another abuse—abuse of the
constitutional freedom churches enjoy managing their own affairs.
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Kathleen Boozang, Paul Hauge, and Catherine Mc Cauliff for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this Article, and gratefully acknowledges the support of the summer re-
search grant provided by Seton Hall University School of Law.
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Not only did dioceses show themselves to be "incapable of properly
handling issues relating to the sexual abuse of children by priests," 1
but also, by treating these incidents as internal personnel matters,
they proved astonishingly unaware of the state's paramount interest in
preventing what were, after all, criminal and tortious acts against mi-
nors.
In light of a growing consensus that the Church 2
 has failed in
the past to protect children from abusive priests, states have begun
to rush in to fill the void by imposing external accountability. In the
process, they are making sure the Church now knows that the matter
of child sexual abuse is rightfully in the states' jurisdiction, both civil
and criminals In state legislatures, there are moves to add "clergy"
to the list of professionals obligated to report suspected child abuse.
Statutes of limitations have been extended in some states, and bills
are pending in many others, to allow for criminal prosecution of
abusive priests and for the filing of new tort lawsuits against dioceses.
Prosecutors have become more aggressive. Grand juries have been
convened and have issued reports filled with scathing criticisms of
church conduct. Courts have shown little regard for constitutional
claims or claims of document privilege made by dioceses. Bishops
have been called to testify in court and before grand juries. And
criminal liability for a diocese—once unimaginable—is now on the
table. In late 2002, the Diocese of Manchester (New Hampshire) en-
tered into an agreement with the state attorney general acknowledg-
ing that it could have been convicted under the state's child endan-
germent statute and accepting state oversight of diocesan
compliance with its own child abuse policies for a five-year period.
The Diocese of Phoenix has also avoided prosecution by entering
Suffolk County Supreme Court Special Grand Jury, Term ID, Grand Jury Report,
CPL § 190.85(1)(C), hup://www.newsday.cominews/local/longisland/ny-suffolkreport
0210,0,2290700.acrobat?coll=nytop-span-headlines (May 6, 2002).
2 I use the term "Church" to refer to the leadership of dioceses and religious orders
collectively across the nation. This is used as a shorthand, and is not meant to define any
legal entity (there is no national Catholic Church) and is not meant to be ecclesiologically
descriptive (the Church is comprised of more than its ordained leadership).
See N.H. NrrouNix GEN., REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OE 'ME DIOCESE OF MAN-
CHESTER (Mar. 3, 2003), available at http://state.nh.us/nhdoj/Press%2ORelease/3303-
diocesepart2.pdf;
 Suffolk County Supreme Court Special Grand Jury, Term ID, Grand
Jury Report, CPL § 190.85(1) (C), supra note 1. For a discussion of the state's complicity in
the Church's mishandling of these matters (for example, court support of delays and
confidentiality agreements), see Dennis R. Hoover, Cutting the Church Less Slack, RELIGION
IN THE NEWS, Summer 2002, hup://www.trincolledu/depts/csrpl/RINVol5No2/
church %201ess%20slack.h tin.
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into an agreement with the State of Arizona. 4
Now, as states respond with new forms of legislation, regulation,
and prosecution, it becomes incumbent upon the Church to cultivate
the practice of responsible freedom. Responsible freedom means first
and foremost the proper, moral use of its freedom in the promotion
of the common good. Second, it means the recognition of, and ap-
propriate response to, legitimate state authority. Finally, it also means
the maintenance of independence and integrity when the Church
must work with the state on matters of common concern. Tracking
this definition, I make the following proposals, some aspects of which
are already underway.
First, the Church must use its broad freedom under the First
Amendment to get its house in order. It must provide compassionate
and comprehensive care for victims, create checks and balances for
internal diocesan accountability, require interdiocesan cooperation
and accountability, give increased attention to lay participation, disci-
pline abusers under canon law, and undertake other measures to cor-
rect past abuse and prevent further abuse. This involves no less than
repentance and reform of institutional church life.
Second, the Church must acknowledge the rightful extent of the
state's jurisdiction in child safety. This involves future obligations to
notify and cooperate with authorities when a minor is abused, and the
recognition that the state properly provides criminal and civil forums
for the peaceful adjudication of claims of past injuries. As a corollary,
the Church must not invoke the First Amendment in ways that would
deprive the state of its appropriate jurisdiction, whether in the regula-
tory, criminal, or tort context. It must not automatically assert
"autonomy" or "confidentiality" as legal claims or defenses. Doing so
only weakens such protective doctrines and makes it more likely that
they will be unavailable when they truly are needed.
Finally, the recognition of the state's rightful jurisdiction must
not be confused with a surrender to the state of the Church's equally
rightful independence. The First Amendment still structures the
4 See Agostino Bono, Phoenix Agreement Raises Issue of State Role in Diocesan Affairs,
CATtiouc NEws SERVICE, http://www.nccatholic.orginews.php?ArtID=1050 ( June 27,
2003); Hoover, supra note 3; Martin Kasindorf et al., Boston Church Scandal Starts Chain
Reaction, USA Tounv, Dec. 19, 2002, at 13A; Jack Kenny, Don't Blame rhurch'for What 'Indi-
viduals' Did, UNION LEADER (Manchester, NH), Dec. 15, 2002, at B3; William Lobdell &
Richard Winton, Mahony Resisting Disclosure, LA. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2003, pt. 2, at 1; Larry B.
Stammer, States Follow California's Lead on Priest Abuse, L.A. Thus, Feb. 13, 2003, pt. 1, at 1;
177 Priests Resigned or Removed from Ministry SinceJanuary, AMERICA, May 13, 2002, at 4-5.
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manner of church-state interaction, and does not permit the state to
run a church. The Church may have lost the trust of society to man-
age itself on the matter of abusive clergy, but the Church is the only
institution that can restore that trust. It cannot simply permit, or in-
vite, the state to regulate or prosecute it back to health. Thus, in
short, the notion of responsible freedom imposes a duty on the
Church to use its freedom for vigorous new life, neither demanding
from the state total deference to internal church management nor
relinquishing to the state the church's task of internal correction.
At their meeting in Dallas in June 2002, the American bishops
focused their attention on the crisis and responded with disciplinary
and preventive measures that create structural and procedural safe-
guards.6
 The bishops' Charter for the Protection of Children and Young
People Revised Edition ("Charter") creates a new office at the Bishops'
Conference, the Office of Child and Youth Protection, charged with
implementing "safe environment" programs in each diocese, among
other tasks. A National Review Board will monitor the work of the
office, as well as other diocesan progress. 6
The Church's response to the crisis has included the important
acknowledgement that the sexual abuse of children is a matter prop-
erly within the state's jurisdiction as well as a moral, pastoral, and dis-
ciplinary matter for the Church. The Charter, which is binding on all
dioceses, requires each diocese to report any allegation by a minor to
civil authorities, and to cooperate with investigations that follow. Be-
yond that, however, diocesan responses to heightened government
scrutiny and aggressive prosecutorial stands have been mixed. No
doubt there has been a tremendous spirit of cooperation and volun-
tary disclosure, with diocesan officials sitting down with prosecutors in
good-faith attempts to work out mutually acceptable solutions. But
6 See U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CHARTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE REVISED EnrrioN, http://www.usccb.org/bishops/charter.
htm (2002) [hereinafter CHARTER]; See also U.S. CONFERENCE OF CA'11101.IC BISHOPS, ES-
SENTIAL NORMS FOR DIOCESAN/EPARCHIAL POLICIES DEALING WITH ALLEGATIONS OF SEX-
UAL ABUSE OF MINORS BY PRIESTS OR DEACONS, http://www.usccb.org/bishops/norms.
htin (2002). Together the Charter and Essential Norms set out the internal processes of a
priest's removal from ministry and possible laicization. Lay review boards in each diocese
will provide confidential advice to the bishop regarding an evaluation of the allegations
and suitability of the priest for continued ministry.
6
 Kathleen McChesney is the executive director of this new office (and formerly the
highest ranking woman at the FBI). This office has commissioned studies to determine the
causes, scope, and financial impact of the crisis. Further, the Charter requires background
checks for all diocesan personnel ill contact with children, and each diocese must have a
staff person whose job is to assist victims.
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some dioceses seem willing to place prosecutors "in a position to give
or withhold from Catholic bishops a clean bill of moral health." 7 By
contrast, other dioceses, fearful that the state will intrude in Church
affairs, continue to make claims of "autonomy" and "confidentiality"
that in some cases are clearly inappropriate and unsupportable. 8
This Article sets out the constitutional framework that governs
the relationship between church and state, and describes various legal
issues relating to clergy. 9 To explore the idea of the Church's steward-
ship of its religious freedom, it next reviews the Catholic social teach-
ings on the proper relationship between church and state, particularly
the Church's acceptance of limits to religious freedom when public
order is violated." The Article then provides examples of ways in
which the Church must cultivate the practice of responsible freedom.
Under responsible freedom, the Church responds properly to the
state's legitimate authority in the matter of clergy sexual abuse, and,
at the same time, resists the temptation to cede to the state the task of
moral and institutional reform."
I. THE RELIGION CLAUSES AND RESPONSIBLE FREEDOM
A. Institutional Freedom for the Church and Its Limits
The religion clauses of the First Amendment to the Constitution
provide that government "shall make no law respecting the establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." John
Courtney Murray, SJ., a Jesuit theologian and philosopher writing at
mid-twentieth century, thought this language captured the classic
Christian understanding of distinct spheres of authority: the state with
temporal authority, and the church with spiritual authority." The First
Amendment's text, history, and tradition have deep affinities with an-
cient Christian notions of the necessary freedom of the person in
Richard John Neuhaus, Scandal Time (Continued), FIRST THINGS, June/July 2002, at
75, 81.
Church, State and Children, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2003, at MO.
9 See infra Part I.
I° See infra Part II.
II See infra Part III.
12 See generally JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, 5.1, WE HOLD THESE TRu.rus: CA•11101.1C
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION (1960).
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matters religious, and the necessary freedom of the Church from state
control."
Judicial and legislative interpretations of these clauses (and their
state constitutional counterparts) have attempted to recognize this
jurisdictional separation, or distinction of spheres. Broad institutional
autonomy has emerged from case law under the Free Exercise Clause
and the Establishment Clause, as well as from the "church autonomy"
cases that rest on both clauses." It is well-settled, for instance, that the
state has no competence in theological matters." The state cannot
review internal church decisions on ecclesiastical matters that have
been resolved by an authorized tribunal." The state cannot exces-
sively entangle itself in the internal workings of a church." Further,
courts and legislatures may grant churches exemptions from other-
wise applicable laws." Thus, a variety of legal principles work together
to ensure that churches are able to "select their own leaders, define
their own doctrines, resolve their own disputes, and run their own
institutions."19
But, in this process of delineating the contours of the free relig-
ious sphere, courts and legislatures also mark the boundaries of the
legitimate authority of law. No freedom is absolute, and churches are
subject to the requirements of coercive law in situations where courts
determine that the freedom and autonomy proper to the church are
not threatened. Distressingly, the state has become expansive in its
claimed scope of authority over churches. The U.S. Supreme Court's
15 See id.; see also Angela C. Carmella, John Courtney Murray, SJ.: On Human Nature, Law,
and Religious Freedom, in LAW, Socirry, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE: THE TEACHINGS OF
MODERN CH RISTIAN in( ( John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., forthcoming 2004).
" Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Presbyterian
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969);
Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
15
 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947);
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
18 See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 701-14; Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 442-52; Kedroff,
344 U.S. at 110-14; Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 10-19; Watson, 80 U.S. at 715-22. States have char-
acterized their inability to review internal church decisions in a variety of ways: as a juris-
dictional bar; as a matter of nonjusticiability; as a matter for judicial abstention; or as an
evidentiary rule. See Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Con-
stitutional Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219,224-26 (2002).
17 Sec Walz v. Tax Cornan, 397 U.S. 664,688-94 (1970).
18 See Employment Div. V. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,888-90 (1990); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205,221-22,236-37 (1972).
18
 Douglas Ltycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church
Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 CoLutd. L. REV. 1373,1389 (1981).
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dramatic changes in the free exercise area, for instance, have left
states free to treat churches like nonreligious entities, subject to neu-
tral laws of general applicability." The Court's more gradual but no
less dramatic changes in the establishment area frequently allow (or
require) states to treat churches on a par with their secular counter-
parts, thereby giving religious organizations access to governmental
benefits that are generally available on nonreligious terms. 21 And ju-
dicial deference to internal church dispute resolution, once thought
to be required, is now optional in certain situations. Civil courts can
adjudicate internal church disputes if they can use "neutral princi-
ples" to resolve the dispute without resort to doctrinal or ecclesiastical
standards. 22 In fact, these jurisprudential movements toward "equal
treatment" and "neutral criteria" have opened churches to a vast array
of regulations and liability (as well as benefits) to an extent not
thought possible thirty years ago.
Many reasons have been offered to explain the jurisprudential
shift toward increased comfort with nondiscriminatory legal jurisdic-
tion over church conduct. Some attribute the shift to a growing secu-
larization and to society's (and courts') attendant blindness to, or
overt hostility toward, religion. 23 Some understand it within the con-
text of the state's tendency to employ coercive laws to crush compet-
ing normative visions. 24 In contrast, some consider it an inevitable de-
velopment resulting from the dependence on secular public reason in
2D Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-90.
21 See Zelman v, Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Good News Club v. Milford
Cent. Sch. Dist., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini V.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819 (1995); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Lamb's Chapel v.
Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 {1993); Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs.
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Widmar v. Vin-
cent, 454 U.S. 263 {1981).
22 See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-10 (1979). This approach "relies exclusively on
objective, well-established concepts of ... law familiar to lawyers and judges. It thereby
promises to free civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doc-
trine, polity, and practice." Id. at 603.
23 See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 105-23 (1993).
24 See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Formoord: Nonzos and Norm-
sive 97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 7-17, 41-53 (1983).
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a pluralistic society. 28
 Others believe that it acknowledges a growing
recognition that the privileging of religion is indefensible. 28
I would prefer, instead, to frame this jurisprudential shift as the
law's attempt, albeit imperfect and at times alarming, to provide for
responsible freedom. As Murray frequently noted, the rule of juris-
prudence of a free society must always be "as much freedom as possi-
ble, as much coercion as necessary."27 The question of ordered lib-
erty—how much order, how much liberty—is both perennially pre-
sent and perennially difficult, and each historical period attempts its
own balance. Courts grapple most explicitly with the freedom-respon-
sibility dynamic on issues of the church-clergy relationship, and in the
area of tort liability for clergy misconduct, which will be discussed
immediately below. Yet, even in this period of increased social and
legal responsibility for churches, there remain two basic constitutional
principles that protect the unique internal life of a religious institu-
tion, which will be discussed later in this Article. First, state interests
must be promoted generally, and not by singling out religion or par-
ticular religious actors. 28 Second, when there is necessary interaction
between church and state on a matter of common concern, the state
must employ an approach that is narrowly tailored to promoting its
interests, and least intrusive into the internal affairs of the chorch.28
B. Institutional Freedom Regarding Clergy and the
Imposition of Tort Liability
Church members or employees who take issue with decisions
made by the churches with which they are associated sometimes at-
tempt to obtain redress from civil courts or legislatures. As a general
matter, autonomy, which accords great deference to church decision
making, is the governing standard in the secular judicial context. The
resulting jurisprudence holds that adult members of a church have
impliedly consented to church governance, and so cannot seek re-
25 See, e.g., Robert W. Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation! Protecting Religious Land User After
Boerne, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 861, 913-22 (2000).
2(' See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, 68 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 925, 926-28 (2000); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfinn Foundation: The
Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITI'LE ROCK L. Rev. 555, 572-74
(1998).
27 JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, The Problem of Religious Freedom, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:
CATHOLIC SUltUGGLES WITH PLURALISM 127, 153-54 (J. Leon Hooper, SJ. ed., 1993).
2s See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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dress against clergy or a church for excommunication or other disci-
pline, or for bad religious counseling." The unhappy member is free
to leave that church.
Similar reasoning undergirds the case law in the employment
context, where clergy persons have attempted to seek redress against
their churches. Decisions regarding the selection of clergy receive vir-
tually total immunity from state review or control. This constitutional
outcome is not surprising given that government involvement in
clergy selection and control is a hallmark of an "established" church;
further, in the language of the "distinct spheres" formulation, such
involvement would go beyond the state's lawful authority, which is lim-
ited to temporal matters only. Thus, as a constitutional matter of both
free exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence, churches can
train, ordain, defrock, and reinstate clergy without interference from
the state." The judicially created "ministerial exception" from civil
rights laws further affirms the zone of protection churches enjoy from
state interference in clergy eligibility and selection. 32 A woman barred
from the priesthood because of her gender has no cause of action in
civil court for sex discrimination. This exception even extends to sex
discrimination and sexual harassment claims brought by women who
serve as pastors in churches that do ordain women. They are barred
from bringing such claims against their church employers—so strong
is the conviction that the state must not intrude in the church-clergy
relationship by taking sides in that dispute."
Because he or she is deemed to have consented to the internal
governance of the employer institution, the clergy person, as em-
ployee, must rely on those protections, if any, provided by internal
canon law or other church law. Thus, in the context of the present
Catholic crisis, any priests subject to laicization or removal from pub-
lic ministry under the terms of the bishops' Charter have no recourse
in civil court for reinstatement on grounds that the church deviated
3° See, e.g., Nally v. Grace Cmty, Church, 763 P.2d 948, 960 (Cal. 1988); Guinn v.
Church of Christ, 775 P.2d 766, 774 (Okla. 1989).
31 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 715-20, 724-25.
32 See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh•day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168-
69 (4th Cir. 1985); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 556-61 (5th Cir. 1972).
33 Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in. Our Constitu-
tional Order, 47 Wu,. L. REV. 37 (2002). The common remedy sought in these cases, rein-
statement, is problematic. Further, defendant church must show its actions were not pre-
textual. See id. at 91. Courts are concerned that Inquiry into the possibility of a pretext
involves interrogation of those in religious authority about the bases, theological and oth-
erwise, of their decision." Id. at 63.
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from its own rules, that its factual findings were wrong, or that the
penalty was wrongfully imposed. The autonomy doctrine gives the
Church broad freedom to administer the Charter's provisions for dis-
ciplining priests found to have sexually abused a child.
The general rule of broad institutional autonomy for the church-
clergy relationship no longer applies, hoWever, when a third party
sues a church regarding clergy conduct. In fact, a growing majority of
jurisdictions allow judicial scrutiny of church decision making in
many tort actions. The "neutral principles" approach, which justifies
civil court jurisdiction over internal church disputes when religious
issues can be avoided, provides the conceptual framework for these
jurisdictions. This approach involves the application of "legal rules or
standards that have been developed and are regularly applied in a
given field of law without particular regard to religious institutions or
doctrines."34
 In tort actions, the "neutral principles" approach permits
a court to assess the reasonableness of church decision making re-
garding a clergy person who has engaged in misconduct, in a way that
purports to avoid religious issues. Thus, in a host of cases that over-
whelmingly involve sexual misconduct of clergy, various corporate
negligence theories (not vicarious liability), such as negligent supervi-
sion, negligent retention or transfer, or negligent hiring, have been
used to provide redress to persons harmed by clergy behavior. 35
In contrast, a substantial minority of jurisdictions applies to these
tort cases the autonomy reasoning developed in the church-clergy re-
lationship cases, thereby precluding redress for persons who sue
churches in tort for various types of clergy misconduct. 36 These courts
reject even the possibility of employing "neutral principles" to such
cases. For them, any judicial inquiry about church decision making
concerning clergy intrudes into the religious nature of this relation-
54
 Idleman, supra note 16, at 259. Professor Idelman notes that jurisdiction over
churches in these cases is justified on several different theories: 1) the "neutral principles"
approach; 2) the conduct is considered secular; 3) the conduct is so minimally religious
that the religious aspect is irrelevant; and 4) miscellaneous categories, such as conduct
affecting third parties, conduct occurring offsite, or intentional or fraudulent conduct. Id.
at 259-66. I refer to these categories collectively as the "neutral principles" approach, as
they all attempt to adjudicate using familiar legal analyses, and without reference to relig-
ious matters.
35
 For a collection of the federal and state cases, see Malicki v. Doe. 814 So. 2d 347, 351
n.2 (Fla. 2002).
35 See, e.g., Napierski v, Unity Church, 802 A.2d 391, 392-93 (Me. 2002) (refusing to
recognize a cause of action for negligent supervision); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434,
441-42 (Wis. 1997) (refusing to recognize a cause of action for negligent supervision). For
a collection of the federal and state cases, see Idleman, supra note 16, at 224-27 nn.17-27.
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ship in a way that either impermissibly impairs the church's institu-
tional free exercise or violates the Establishment Clause prohibition
against excessive entanglement in church affairs. Insofar as the claims
sound in negligence, these courts refuse to create (or let a jury cre-
ate) a "reasonable religion" standard.
Obviously, for cases of clergy sexual abuse of minors, a jurisdic-
tion's approach is critical to whether a victim can sue for damages. In
jurisdictions that locate church decision making regarding abusive
priests within the sphere of protected church autonomy, even deci-
sions by bishops to quietly reassign known pedophiles to other par-
ishes, motivated solely by the desire to avoid negative publicity, would
constitute "irreducibly religious practices or expressions of faith and
doctrine."37 In such autonomy jurisdictions, a sexual abuse victim of a
priest would have no recourse in tort law against the itistitution that
knew of a priest's behavior and failed to protect his victims.
In contrast, in those jurisdictions that accept a "neutral princi-
ples" approach, the victim's claims against the church can be adjudi-
cated if the dispute can be resolved without recourse to religious doc-
trines. Especially in cases like these, where the clergy person's
behavior itself is not religiously motivated and actually violates the
church's own teachings, courts have been more disposed to viewing
the church's decision making on such matters as falling outside any
legitimate sphere of church autonomy. In fact, courts increasingly re-
ject the notion of a sacred sphere in which all decisions are "irreduci-
bly religious." For instance, in a recent Florida case finding "neutral
principles" applicable- to a child's tort claim against the church in a
priest sexual abuse case, the state's high court observed:
We note that many of the decisions holding that the First.
Amendment bars tort claims based on similar allegations in a
complaint arise at the motion to dismiss stage and appear to
be grounded in theoretical speculation that an inquiry into a
religious institution's conduct would result in excessive en-
tanglement. In contrast, many courts that have actually ad-
judicated these claims, or have at least reached the summary
judgment phase, have done so based on a record revealing
little, if any, doctrinal entanglement and certainly not exces-
sive entanglement. 38
37
 Idleman, supra note 16, at 228.
38 Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 365 n,19,
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For those who remain unconvinced that the religion-less lens of
"neutral principles" is wise or even possible, the autonomy approach
is not the only alternative. 39
 Some legal theorists have suggested that a
strict liability theory is faithful to the religion clauses, because it
avoids an intrusive judicial inquiry into a church's decision-making
process while still permitting the redress of harm. Robert F. Cochran,
Jr. writes, "such liability should be imposed only when . . . clerical su-
pervisors are on notice of the clergy member's propensity toward sex-
ual exploitation."40 Cochran and Robert M. Ackerman write, "Strict
liability would create a strong incentive for [churches] to protect their
members but would leave it to the church to determine how best to
eliminate the risk. The [church] and leaders could determine the
proper combination of discipline, counseling, and oversight to be
employed."'" Thus, strict liability "avoid[s] having the state evaluate
the reasonableness of the [church]'s response. Nevertheless, strict
liability would create an incentive for the church to take effective
steps to protect children . . ."42
Cochran and Ackerman propose that strict liability be combined
with damage caps in recognition of the fact that the financial effects
of tort litigation can be devastating, and that large damage awards
may be attributable in some cases to antireligious discrimination.
Cochran suggests that legislatures impose damage limits, and that
"courts ... freely exercise the option of remittitur in cases where there
is a danger of religious prejudice."43 In the Catholic context, the
financial impact is staggering. Already, dioceses have paid an esti-
mated amount somewhere between $350 million and $1 billion pri-
marily in settlement costs, and a study by the Office of Child and
Youth Protection is under way to determine the actual cost." Addi-
tionally, bankruptcy—a process that would entail an enormous loss of
autonomy—is being contemplated by some dioceses. 45
° For a criticism of the "neutral principles" approach, see Angela C. Carmella, A Theo-
logical Critique of Free Exercise Jurisprudence 60 Gr.o. WAstt. L. REV. 782 (1992).
40 Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Tbrt Law and Intermediate Communities: Calvinist and Catholic
Insights, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 486, 503 (Michael W McConnell
et al. eds., 2001).
41 ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. & ROBERT M. ACKERMAN, LAW AND COMMUNITY: THE CASE
OF Trials 113 (forthcoming Jan. 2009).
42 Cochran, supra note 40, at 503.
45 Id. at 504.
44 Punishing the Church, AMERICA, Apr. 22, 2002, at 3.
45 See David A. Skeel, Jr., Avoiding Moral Bankruptcy, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1181, 1183, 1192-99
(2003).
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C. Responsible Freedom Under the First Amendment
The trend toward the use of "neutral principles," at least in the
tort context, is an example of the larger jurisprudential trend of im-
posing greater social responsibility on churches. Tort liability holds
actors accountable for the harms that result from their actions, and is
a vehicle for tempering religious freedom with responsibility. Given
increased attention to church conduct by regulatory and criminal
authorities, it is appropriate to explore the more general phenome-
non of making the free exercise of religion the responsibly free exercise
of religion. We begin by defining the "right to responsible freedom"
under the religion clauses of the First Amendment.
Responsible freedom cannot mean simply that churches must be
law abiding, although most are in most instances." Further, responsi-
ble freedom cannot mean simply that churches owe benefits to society
in exchange for their freedoms, although most churches do provide a
broadly stabilizing presence in most communities and promote the
common good in many ways, especially through education and social
services. 47 Moreover, responsible freedom cannot mean simply that
churches are inunune from civil law only when their own alternatives
meet the goals of the state and the society," although this has often
been the case. Courts have been more willing to grant exemptions
from general laws when a church's alternative was congruent with the
"Even after Employment Division v. Smith, courts can still mandate religious exemptions
in certain circumstances. Smith, which removed strict scrutiny judicial review for free exer-
cise challenges to generally applicable and facially neutral laws, did not affect all free exer-
cise cases. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 888. The earlier, more protective standards remain in place
for cases of hybrid rights and of individualized assessment by government, and where a law
lacks generality and neutrality. See id. at 878-79.882. Further, the church autonomy prece-
dent is unaffected by Smith. See id.
47 This argument of quid pro quo was rejected in 'IVatz, 397 U.S. at 677-80, although
numerous federal and state courts and legislatures have acknowledged this positive role of
churches. It has been central to cases upholding vouchers to religious schools and grants
to religious social services. See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 672-76; Bowen v. Kendrick, 987 U.S,
589,616-22 (1988).
48 With respect to a civil court's deference to a church's dispute resolution, however,
the existence of an alternative legal system is required. A civil court can abstain from de-
ciding a controversy only when it is possible for a court to find that the case is actually
governed by the internal law or doctrinal principles of the church, and that there are
church authorities who are charged with the responsibility of deciding such disputes."
MICHAEL. S. AMENS & ROBERT A. Desmo, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY
499 (1996).
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state's goals, and arguably provided a superior way of reaching those
goals.49
Thus, the jurisprudence does not affirmatively require churches,
in their freedom, to serve social goals, although they typically do. But,
even though a church's constitutional freedom is not conditioned
upon the provision of some social good, it is not absolute. There is
one condition attached to all exercises of freedom: that the use of the
freedom will not. breach minimal responsibilities owed to the larger
society as those responsibilities are embodied in legitimate laws. Of
course this can only be articulated in the most general of terms, and
must be enforced in the narrowest of ways, always with a presumption
in favor of freedom. Nonetheless, the limits on freedom are clear.
Legislatures grant religious exemptions only where they conclude that
doing so is consistent with the well being of society. 5° State constitu-
tions commonly list religious freedom as a protected liberty, but not if
it involves licentious behavior or practices that threaten the peace and
safety of the state. Similarly, court-mandated free exercise exemptions
are conditioned explicitly on a judicial conclusion that the freedom
does not undermine a compelling governmental interest." Even sup-
porters of frequent religious exemptions from general laws do not
suggest that the right to an exemption is absolute or that the religious
claimant's constitutional protection excuses harm to others. Instead,
when we disagree with a judicial finding that a compelling interest is
threatened, we challenge its finding that the exemption would in fact
cause harm, or challenge the way the court measures the magnitude
of the harm. We do not argue that the exemption should be upheld
regardless of the nature or magnitude of the social harm. And finally,
49 See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 914-15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that members
of Native American tribes who use ceremonial peyote are less likely to abuse recreational
drugs and alcohol); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 224-26 (finding that Amish homeschooling and way
of life did not threaten the wider society's values but, in fact, that the Amish held tradi-
tional American values of hard work and cooperation); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d
393, 399 (Minn. 1990) (finding that Amish safety stripes on slow moving vehicles were
more effective than the orange triangles required by state).
5° In Bob Jones University v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court went so far as to say
the tax exemption of a religious school was dependent upon its compliance with Unpor-
tam public policy (here, racial equality). 461 U.S. 574, 592-96, 603 (1983).
51
 Court-mandated exemptions remain operative in those categories of cases not af-
fected by Smith and in judicial interpretations of statutory strict scrutiny, as that formula-
tion is found in the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (as it is applicable to fed-
eral action), in state protective legislation (mini-RFRAs), and in the federal Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,
42 U.S.C. §§2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000); Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act, id. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5.
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although the autonomy doctrine does not explicitly contemplate the
possibility of an overriding compelling state interest, it is obvious that
church conduct that created a significant threat to society would be
deemed to fall within the state's temporal jurisdiction.
IL CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND RESPONSIBLE FREEDOM
Interpretations of the religion clauses regard only obliquely the
moral action of churches in the promotion of the common good, but
they regard quite directly the propriety of laws imposed upon
churches and the maintenance of proper institutional boundaries be-
tween church and state. That is why the notion of responsible free-
dom is defined by reference to the legal responsibilities churches owe
to society. Catholic teachings embrace both the affirmative duty
(owed not to the state but to God) of church leaders to behave mor-
ally and promote the common good in conditions of freedom, and
the recognition of the legitimate role of the state to limit that free-
dom in some circumstances. 52
Lay Catholics who have criticized the actions of the Church's
leaders as the crisis has unfolded have focused, among other things,
on the bishops' complete lack of accountability to local churches and
to each other for their decision making. As Notre Dame's Scott Ap-
pleby said when he addressed the bishops at their Dallas conference
in June 2002, the cause of the scandal was "a betrayal of fidelity en-
abled by the arrogance that comes with unchecked power." 55 Al-
though the abuse itself was morally indefensible, so were many of the
"unchecked" episcopal decisions concerning abusers and their vic-
tims. But this "unchecked" power also constituted an abuse of the
broad constitutional freedoms enjoyed by the Church to manage itself
almost entirely without governmental involvement. Some church
officials treated the sexual violation of children and young people as
mere church personnel issues, not as matters of profound state and
societal concern. Thus, the enormous moral failure to protect minors
was further compounded by a failure to acknowledge the legal inter-
est of the state in the protection of minors.
52 See generally Declaration on Religious Freedom, in TUE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN El 675,
696 (Walter M. Abbott, Si. ed., 1966). In the use of all freedoms, the moral principle of
personal and social responsibility is to be observed." Id. at 686.
53 Scott Appleby, The Church at Risk: Remarks to the USCCB, http://www.usccb.org/
bishops/appleby.htm (June 13, 2002).
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The Church's social teachings explicitly develop the concept of
responsible freedom. This is not surprising, given the emphasis in
those teachings on the social nature of the person, the importance of
communities, and the state's role in protecting human dignity in its
personal and communal dimensions by enforcing correlative rights
and duties. My purpose in discussing the Church's position on re-
sponsible freedom is to suggest the need for coherence between its
moral and legal approach to the sexual abuse crisis. The Church has
publicly represented to the world in its social teachings that it de-
mands freedom from the slate and that it accepts certain limits to that
freedom when the public order is involved. The Church's own under-
standing of what is a legitimate limit to its freedom, especially as ar-
ticulated in the 1965 Declaration on Religious Freedom ("Declaration") of
the Second Vatican Council, should inform its approach here.
A. Subsidimity and the Role of the State
The social teachings began with Pope Leo XIII and his 1890 en-
cyclical Rerum Novaram. 54 They offer a picture of a society in which
multiple communities promote the common good. These communi-
ties—the family, churches, professional and occupational organiza-
tions, voluntary associations, cultural groups, and the like—have
specific purposes and ends, and need freedom and autonomy to pur-
sue their proper ends. The requisite freedom for these communities
comes under the rubric of "subsidiarity," according to which tasks
proper to groups that are smaller or at a lower level are not to be un-
dertaken by groups that are larger or at a higher level. The state,
through its laws, coordinates these groups in the promotion of the
common good; but the state does not absorb or assume the tasks of
these groups (and in fact protects their freedom by law). 55 These
communities establish the social world for the human person and set
the preconditions for human dignity and freedom.
" See generally Angela C. Carmella, A Catholic View of Law andjustice, in CHRISTIAN PER-
SPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 40, at 255.
55 The principle of subsidiarity is limited by the principle of "socialization," the in-
creasing interdependence of social groups, in which the state may legitimately assume
partial or full regulatory (or even substantive) responsibility for many of these efforts. This
envisions a greater cooperation between nongovernmental and governmental groups, but
even in a situation of increasing socialization, the independence of nongovernmental
groups must not be destroyed. There is a "need to insure that the multiple forms of hu-
man community are not obliterated by the power of the state." DAVID HOLLENBACH, Sj.,
CLAIMS IN CONFLICT: RETRIEVING AND RENEWING "IllE CATHOLIC HUMAN RIGHTS TRADI-
TION 157-59 (1979).
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In addition to its legal coordination of these communities, the
state can intervene in their affairs "whenever this is necessary for the
remedy of harm."56 The state's function is to ensure "public order,"
defined as public peace, public morality, and the enforcement of civil
rights and duties of all citizens, as it directs and coordinates social ef-
forts in pursuit of the common good. As it exercises this public order
role, the state's purposes are "justice, freedom, security, the general
welfare, and civil unity or peace."57 Catholic social thought sees law as
heavy handed, and coercive in nature. Therefore, freedom is to be
restricted only in specific circumstances to correct injury, and only
when it is prudent to do so. In fact, law is to be limited precisely be-
cause other institutions like families and churches and schools are
charged with imparting moral direction and other human goods.
B. Religious Freedom and the State's Public Order Function
The Declaration builds upon this vision to set out in finer detail
the proper relationship between church and state.5s The Declaration is
the only conciliar document addressed to the whole world. It is con-
sidered the American contribution to the Council and was clearly
influenced by the First Amendment. But it is very much a Catholic
document, written in light of, and in the language of, the Catholic
natural law tradition.
Consistent with the general approach taken in subsidiarity the-
ory—legal protection of freedom for communities and cautious legal
intervention only in the face of harm—the Declaration speaks directly
to religious freedom of individuals, families, and churches. The state
is necessarily secular and independent from religious institutions. It
plays no sacral role and has no theological competence. It can act
only with respect to temporal matters, including the protection of all
aspects of human dignity. And, because the right to religious freedom
is rooted in human dignity, the state is charged with its protection. 59
56 Id. at 159.
57 MURRAY, supra note 12, at 286.
5s For a discussion of the developments since the issuance of the Declaration, see gen-
erally HERMINIO Rico, Sj., JOHN PAUL 11 AND THE LEGACY OF MCNITATIS HUMANAE
(2002).
59 Under the Declaration, religion is an aspect of the temporal common good. Religious
freedom is considered so intricately related to the good of society that:
[G]overnment is to assume the safeguard of the religious freedom of all its
citizens, in an effective manner, by just laws and by other appropriate means.
Government is also to help create conditions favorable to the fostering of re-
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No person or religious group can be coerced to believe or practice a
faith or be restrained from its own belief or practice absent a threat to
public order.
Under the Declaration., churches have broad freedom for public
worship, teaching, and witness; for establishing and operating schools,
charities, and other social organizations; and for public critique of
issues of interest to the wider society. The Declaration states a general
autonomy principle, that churches may "govern themselves according
to their own norms ... [and] have the right not to be hindered, ei-
ther by legal measures or by administrative action on the part of gov-
ernment, in the selection, training, appointment, and transferal of
their own ministers."60
The Declaration, however, calls not simply for freedom, but for
responsible freedom, and makes clear that all freedoms enjoyed by
churches are subject to restriction whenever religious conduct violates
the public order. If religious conduct of any kind violates the public
order—the public peace, public morality, or the rights of others—le-
gal intervention is warranted. 61 In his comments on the Declaration,
which he helped to draft, Murray wrote:
The public order of society is a part of the universal moral
order: its requirements must be rooted in moral law. Second,
public order exhibits a threefold content. First, the order of
society is essentially an order of justice, in which the rights of
all citizens are effectively safeguarded, and provision is made
for peaceful settlement of conflicts of rights. Second, the or-
der of society is a political order, an order of peace. Public
peace, however, is not the result of repressive action by the
police. It is, in the classic concept, the work of justice; it
comes about, of itself, when the demands of justice are met,
and when orderly processes exist for the airing and settling
of grievances. Third, the order of society is a moral order, at
ligious life, in order that the people may be truly enabled to exercise their re-
ligious rights and to fulfill their religious duties, and also in order that society
itself may profit by the moral qualities of justice and peace which have their
origin in men's faithfulness to God and to His holy will.
Declaration on Religious Freedom, supra note 52, at 685.
6° Id, at 682.
6l Id. at 685-87.
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least in the sense that certain minimal standards of public
morality are enforced at all.°
In addition, the Declaration points specifically to two practices that
should be condemned as abuses of the right to religious freedom:
when faith is shared in a coercive or disrespectful manlier, especially
among the poor or uneducated; 65 and when churches commit abuses
on the pretext of religious freedom. Regarding the latter, the Declara-
tion states, "[S]ociety has the right to defend itself against possible
abuses committed on the pretext of freedom of religion. It is the spe-
cial duty of government to provide this protection?"
Public order clearly is implicated in the sexual abuse of children
by clergy. Although it is obvious that abusive priests themselves make
no claim to religious free exercise, dioceses have rebuffed tort litiga-
tion on the ground that decisions to reassign abusive priests were part
of the free exercise of religion, involving matters of church doctrine
and interpretation. 65 But this argument is not supported by the
Church's own teaching. The practice of reassigning abusive priests
implicated public order in all three of its dimensions: it violated the
rights of others, the public peace, and the public morality. This prac-
tice made possible the continued sexual abuse of minors, which is
criminal and tortious conduct. It threatened the public peace by pro-
viding safe haven, and even public stature, for abusers, and it enabled
the continuation of conduct that was widely considered by the public
to be immoral. Although normally the practice of transferring a priest
is a religious decision left up to his superiors, in this particular con-
text it comes squarely within the state's jurisdiction. The Declaration
clearly states that "religious bodies rightfully claim freedom in order
that they may govern themselves according to their own norms" with
the critical proviso: only when "the just requirements of public order
are observed."68 In Murray's words, when public order is not ob-
served, the conduct "ceases to be religious exercise and becomes a
penal offense."67
62 John Courtney Murray, Sj., Annotations to Declaration on Religious Freedom, in TOE
DOCUMENTS OF Writ:AN II, supra note 52, at 675, 686 n.20.
63
 Declaration on Religious Freedom, supra note 52, at 682.
64 Id, at 686.
68 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
66 Declaration on Religious Freedom, supra note 52, at 682.
67 Murray, supra note 62 at 686 n.20. Murray read the religion clauses as articles of
peace, not articles of faith. MURRAY, supra note 12, at 50. Because of the nonsacral nature
of the state, he opposed any interpretation of the clauses that would imply "ultimate be-
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Of course, to say that this action is now properly within the state's
jurisdiction does not answer whether particular legal measures are
proper exercises of that jurisdiction. In addition to constitutional con-
tours that define the legitimacy of state action," the Catholic tradition
describes two kinds of checks on the way in which the state exercises
its power, even when the public order justifies restrictions of religious
freedom. The first is the limit of prudential judgment on human
law," and the second is the necessity of a least restrictive alternative.
The prudential analysis of whether a particular law is appropriate asks
two main questions: Is the law necessary or useful for the common
good in the given circumstances? Is this a wise use of the govern-
ment's coercive force? Then it asks subsidiary questions: Will the law
be obeyed? Is it enforceable? Could it give rise to harmful effects in
other areas of society? What has experience taught us in this area?
What does prudent reflection tell us?" Thus, among the host of legal
measures currently under consideration to address the clergy abuse
crisis, all may be said to advance or protect "public order," but not all
may be prudent, wise, or necessary steps for addressing past harm or
preventing future harm.
When the state justifiably infringes on religious exercise, it must
do so in a way that limits freedom as narrowly as possible. The Declara-
tion provides that "the freedom of man [shall] be respected as far as
possible, and curtailed only when and in so far as necessary." 71 As
Murray adds, before religious conduct can be restricted, it must be
clear that:
the violation of the public order be really serious; that legal
or police intervention be really necessary; that regard be had
for the privileged character of religious freedom, which is
not simply to be equated with other civil rights; [and] that
the rule of jurisprudence of the free society be strictly ob-
liefs, certain specific sectarian tenets with regard to the nature of religion, religious truth,
the church, faith, conscience, divine revelation, human freedom." Id. at 48. He developed
this argument in response to some Protestants who thought that the clauses embodied an
individualist theology and free church ecclesioiogy. He would similarly deny that the
clauses embody Catholic theology and ecclesiology or imply absolute legal protection for
the church hierarchy. As articles of peace, the religion clauses are "only a law, not a dogma
... not invested with the sanctity that attaches to dogma, but only with the rationality that
attaches to law." Id. at 49.
6s See supra Part land infra Part III.
69 MURRAY, supra note 12, at 166-67.
7° See id.
71
 Declaration on Religious Freedom, supra note 52, at 687.
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served, [namely], as much freedom as possible, as much co-
ercion as necessary. 72
Thus, for example, the public order rationale together with the re-
quirement of a least restrictive alternative would not sanction a law
that required a church to obtain state permission before a priest is
moved from one parish to another, or to another diocese. Such over-
sight would violate in a most fundamental way the institutional
boundaries between church and state, and would not be narrowly tai-
lored to the needs of the state. But, the determination, in tort litiga-
tion against a church, that diocesan supervisors were reckless in their
decision to reassign a priest in the face of their knowledge of his sex-
ual abuse of other children meets the test as a narrow restriction. It
does not prospectively regulate the church's freedom but allows in-
stead the specific redress of particular past harms.
III. RESPONSIBLE FREEDOM IN ADDRESSING CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE OF
CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE
Pursuant to both American and Catholic visions of responsible
freedom, the Church must recognize the rightful extent of the state's
jurisdiction over matters of public order, which involve not only the
behavior of abusive clergy, but also the church-clergy relationship.
Further, both American and Catholic visions require a clear institu-
tional boundary between church and state, and the maintenance of
the church's independence and integrity when the Church finds itself
in a necessary relationship with the state on matters of common con-
cern. My argument is this: to properly steward its religious freedom
on the matter of child abuse, first, the Church must use its freedom
for moral and structural reform. Second, in its recognition of the
state's proper jurisdiction and its concern for its own independence
and integrity, the Church must neither demand complete deference
to its internal management nor relinquish its task of internal correc-
tion to the state. At both extremes, real internal reform will be
thwarted, and constitutional freedoms vital to the life of the Church
will be lost. This Part explores the topics of tort litigation and indi-
vidualized church-state agreements, where the danger of these ex-
tremes is greatest.
72 MURRAY, SUM note 27, at 153-54.
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A. Recognizing the State's RightfidJulisdiction: Rethinking the Autonomy
Defense to Tort Liability
Tort liability undoubtedly will have an enormous impact on the
future of the Church and its financial ability to carry out its mission.
One might think that the best way to protect the continued free exer-
cise of the Church would be to assert the defense of church auton-
omy. Most Church lawyers use such a defense (where it is still avail-
able) to block litigation against a diocese on the theory that any
scrutiny of decisions made regarding the abusive priest would neces-
sarily involve the court or jury in matters of doctrine and its interpre-
tation. In some instances, they are correct. For instance, the claim of
negligent ordination or negligent hiring cuts deeply into the freedom
of churches to select clergy, and should not be able to proceed." But,
with respect to claims of negligent supervision of abusive priests (or
the strict liability variant discussed above), I will make a counter-
intuitive suggestion: that the best way to protect the continued free
exercise of the Church is to forgo the autonomy defense. In cases
where the allegations are false, or where the diocese acted in a truly
defensible way, the Church should defend itself in court so that it can
tell its story. "Only the legal process of discovery, by which a lawsuit
proceeds through the mandatory production of documents, records,
and personal testimony, will clarify the facts." 74 Where the allegations
regarding the abuse and the clerical supervision of the abuser are
credible, the focus ought to be on a peaceful and just settlement of
the dispute, using a comprehensive "response of pastoral, spiritual,
emotional, and restorative care," including monetary settlemen
There are four reasons for relinquishing the autonomy defense
in litigation claiming negligent supervision. It is not prudent; it con-
73 See, e.g.J.M. v. Minn. Dist. Council of the Assemblies of God, 658 N.W.2d 589. 593-
95 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
74 Mark A. Sargent, Legal Defense: When Sued, How Should the Church Behave? COMMON-
WEAL„ June 14, 2002, at 13. It should be noted that the particular polity of a church should
not be relevant to the tort of negligent supervision. Actions against a church entity for
negligent supervision are easy to conceptualize in churches with hierarchical polities,
where priests are under the supervision of identifiable church leaders. This is more
difficult to see in congregational polities, where a pastor might serve at the invitation of a
congregation, under a contract with a board of trustees or elders. To ensure parity among
various church polities in the adjudication of negligent supervision actions, these causes of
action should be available against whomever has the power to hire, fire, discipline, or
evaluate the performance of a clergy person—in short, against the identifiable persons)
or entity charged with overseeing the conduct (and addressing misconduct) of the clergy
person.
76 Richard John Neuhaus, Sexual and Related Disorders, FIRST THINGS, Mar. 2003, at 68.
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tradicts the Church's own teaching; it is not supported by the auton-
omy doctrine itself; and it endangers the future vitality of the auton-
omy doctrine.
First, prudence counsels against an autonomy defense. As a gen-
eral matter, the notion of church autonomy in this context has been
discredited." Had earlier claims of autonomy (together with
confidentiality) succeeded, we would not know what we now know. 77
Given what we do know of the internal workings of the Church on
clergy sexual abuse, a defense like this only gives rise to speculation
that the bishop's behavior must have been inexcusable and that the
diocese simply wants to hide the truth from public view. This runs
contrary to the Dallas Charter's promise of openness, accountability,
and cooperation."
Second, the Church's social teachings do not support the use of
an autonomy defense in this context. The claim of autonomy denies
the state's jurisdiction over the matter. Yet the Catholic concept of
subsidiarity recognizes that "the state may intervene in intermediate
communities in order to protect individuals. Communities have
power; they should use that power to benefit people, not to harm
people."'" And, the Second Vatican Council's Declaration provides for
legal restrictions against religious practices that violate the public or-
der. As I have argued above, the reassignment of abusive priests who
continued to harm children violated the public order in all three of
its dimensions: it violated the rights of others, the public peace, and
the public morality.
Moreover, the Declaration is clear that the state must provide a
forum for the settlement of disputes. The existence of a forum for
peaceful settlement of conflicts is at the heart of the state's public or-
der role so that the rights of all citizens are "effective Ely] safe-
guard[ed]" and the public peace is preserved. 80
 Public peace is, as
Murray reminds us, "in the classic concept, the work of justice; it
comes about, of itself, when the demands of justice are met, and when
76 When lawyers for the Archdiocese of Boston sought dismissal of five hundred law-
suits on the grounds of "autonomy," Judge Constance Sweeney denied the motion, saying
that "the doctrine of autonomy that the church was asserting would give leaders 'un-
qualified immunity from secular, Jegal redress, regardless of how negligent, reckless or
intentional' their behavior." Lobdell & 'Winton, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 1.
77 Joseph A. Reaves, Unsung Judges Lead Way in Priest Investigations, Tux ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
Feb. 23, 2003, at IA.
78 See, e.g., CHARTER, supra note 5, arts. 4, 7, 8.
lg Cochran, supra note 90, at 498.
8° Declaration on Religious Freedom, supra note 52, at 686-87.
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orderly processes exist for the airing and settling of grievances: 131 A
system in which accusations and defenses are played out solely in the
media (with easy destruction of reputations with false accusations),
without any structured forum in which to defend allegations, would
be no system at all. Having a forum for the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes is essential to justice for the Church, just as it is essential to jus-
tice for the victims.
Third, constitutional law does not support the use of an auton-
omy defense. Even on the most generous reading of the doctrine, the
element necessary for an autonomy defense is missing in the case of
sexual abuse of children: voluntariness.82 Deeply embedded in the
doctrine is the implied consent of members and clergy to submit to
the decision-making authority of the church. If they do not like the
decision, they are free to leave. But, a child cannot be said to have
consented to a loss of civil legal rights because he is free to leave if he
does not like the priest's behavior or the bishop's decision. Further,.
consent aside, this matter involves the physical health and safety of
children, which is traditionally considered a state interest of the high-
est order, capable of outweighing an autonomy claim."
Fourth, the long-term jurisprudential effects of the inappropriate
use of the autonomy doctrine could be disastrous, The church
autonomy doctrine is essential to the freedom of churches, particu-
larly in situations where the church's teachings do not correspond to
prevailing societal opinions or norms. But, employing it in cases
where wrongdoing is clear, and where there is no normative conflict
with society, indicates a disregard for legitimate legal authority. In the
present situation, a court that until now has accepted the church
autonomy doctrine might reject it—not just in the case before it, but
for all tort actions. Or, perhaps a court might decide on a complete
reinterpretation, and drastic narrowing, of the doctrine outside the
al Murray, supra note 62, at 686 ri.20.
82 See Laycock, supra note 19, at 1405-06. 'Voluntary affiliation with the group is the
premise on which group autonomy depends." Id. at 1405.
83 Id. at 1406.
84
 These concerns are not unfounded. The U.S. Supreme Court has already demon-
strated what it can do in such cases where it considers a doctrine to have been inappropri-
ately invoked. In Employment Division i2 Smith, the Court rejected strict scrutiny judicial
review for nearly all free exercise claims because it thought the case before it stretched the
logic of the free exercise claim to completely unreasonable limits. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
When, in the Court's view, drug-using drug counselors, who were fired and subsequently
denied unemployment compensation because the drug use was criminal, challenged the
denial on free exercise grounds, the Court saw a "system in which each conscience is a law
unto itself," and a system which was bound to produce social anarchy. Id. at 890.
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tort context. Courts might begin to assume that the behavior that is
being claimed as protected by "autonomy" is not a sincere claim of
religious freedom at all, but rather a cover for any intentional, negli-
gent, or reckless decision made by a church. This could lead to fur-
ther narrowing of the autonomy doctrine.
To say that the Church should defend tort claims that are defen-
sible and settle ones that are not still does not address the financial
impact of the crisis, especially as it limits service to the poor, who suf-
fer the most from a massive redistribution of funds. As Villanova Law
School's dean, Mark Sargent., has written:
The Church's] resources are gathered and spent not for
profit, but primarily for charitable, educational, and spiritual
purposes. The deserving victims must get their fair share,
but that does not mean that church institutions must be
bankrupted to compensate what is, in relative terms, a small
number of victims of a small number of priests. This is not
just a matter of fairness; the social and spiritual costs of such
a wealth transfer would be unsupportable. 85
Good faith efforts by the Church to compensate victims and to accept
responsibility should be met with damage caps or other measures
aimed at protecting the financial viability of nonprofits in cases like
these.86
B. Maintaining Institutional Boundaries: Preventing the Loss of Church
Integrity in Individualized Agreements with the State
There are and will be child protection laws that are generally ap-
plicable to churches, as well as individualized interaction between
state and church officials, on this matter, as it is a matter of common
concern to both institutions. The religion clauses of the First
Amendment provide ample precedent for maintaining the integrity of
the church-state boundary. There are two overriding limitations on
state action. First, the state is prohibited from treating this problem as
a Catholic problem. It must employ general approaches for the pro-
85 Sargent, supra note 74, at 15.
86 Making this cap available to a broad category of nonprofit institutions would avoid
Establishment Clause infirmities. Additionally, in places where statutes of limitations are
suspended and litigation against churches is effectively invited, damage caps would allevi-
ate the enormous financial burden directly attributable to the change in law and would be
found constitutional. See, e.g., Tex. Monthly v. Bullock, 989 U.S. 1 (1989); Corp. of Presid-
ing Bishop v. Amos, 983 U.S. 327 (1987).
1056	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 44:1031
tection of children. Second, when there is necessary interaction be-
tween church and state on an individualized basis, the state must em-
ploy the "least intrusive alternative," that is, an approach narrowly tai-
lored to achieving its goals.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has been less willing to ex-
empt religious conduct from generally applicable laws, it has made
clear that the jurisprudence of the religion clauses stands firm against
laws that discriminate against, or single out, religion or religious
groups and laws that discriminate among religious groups.° Laws that
apply to religious behavior but do not touch comparable conduct by
secular actors are not generally applicable or facially neutral, and,
therefore, must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.
Yet typically, the fact that such laws are underinclusive means that the
interest they serve is not sufficiently compelling. For if it truly pro-
moted a compelling state interest, the law would regulate or prohibit
the conduct regardless of the actor's identity, religious or secular.
Thus, the state is prohibited from treating the sexual abuse of
minors as a Catholic problem, or even as . a "clergy" problem. Regret-
tably, such abuse occurs in families, schools, voluntary associations,
and in other institutions public and private—anywhere adults in posi-
tions of trust supervise or have contact with minors. The state itself
has had a mixed record in monitoring and protecting abused chil-
dren within its own child protective services jurisdiction. When the
state acts to make the Church accountable to society for its irrespon-
sible decisions, it must do so in a way that takes into account the
breadth of the problem, and avoids targeted regulation or selective
prosecution of churches by ensuring that other institutions are sub-
ject to comparable scrutiny. The protection of children from sexual
abuse is clearly an interest of the highest order and, therefore, should
be punished wherever it is found and prevented through generally
applicable measures.
One example of a general, broadly applicable measure is the
mandatory reporting statute. Clergy and other church personnel are
currently required to report in many states 88 New legislation is being
introduced across the country to add clergy to an already broad class
of professionals in many of the states that have not yet done so. Add-
ing clergy to the list is related to the state's goal, and is not an uncon-
81 Church of the Lukumi BabaIti Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Lar-
son v. Valente, 452 U.S. 904 (1982).
88 See Norman Abrams, Addressing the Tension Between the Clergy•Communicant Privilege
and the Duty to Report Child Abuse in Stale Statutes, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1127, 1138-39 (2003).
2003]	 Visions of Responsible Religious Freedom 	 1057
stitutional "targeting" of religion. At a minimum, such reporting (to-
gether with cooperation in any investigation) is necessary to ensure
that the state can do its job. The bishops' Charter already agrees to
abide by such reporting requirementsP
Protecting children from sexual abuse is no doubt a compelling
governmental interest. Does that mean that any nondiscriminatory
state action against a church is justified? Of course not. Nondiscrimi-
nation is not the only constitutional safeguard for churches. As we saw
above," the religion clauses preserve the fundamental jurisdictional
boundary between the temporal and spiritual spheres. Church relig-
ious conduct and decisions on religious matters, which are outside the
state's jurisdiction, have protection. The Establishment Clause's pro-
hibition on excessive entanglement, though developed in the context
of state support of a religious institution, is likewise a jurisdictional
protection—it conveys the same prohibition against intrusion into
religious matters that are beyond the rightful temporal powers of the
state. The state cannot intrude so severely in internal operations that
it remakes the church in its own image, or "set[si up a church."91
Based upon institutional autonomy and nonentanglement prece-
dents, the state is required to employ the least intrusive alternative
available to it when promoting its interests. Such a requirement en-
sures that the state remains within the proper boundaries of temporal
concerns—which is the ultimate purpose and function of the religion
clauses.
The possibility of unconstitutional overreaching is of particular
concern when the state cleats with churches not by general regulation
but by specific relationships created pursuant to generally applicable
tort causes of action and criminal laws. When state action necessarily
intrudes in the life of a church, the law attempts to ensure that the
relationship is highly structured 92
 and that the state action is narrowly
tailored to its temporal interest. For instance, the neutral principles
approach purports to do this in the tort context—permitting tempo- .
ral jurisdiction over a church but not over those religious matters ex-
clusively within the church's domain. (The strict liability proposal of
Cochran and Ackerman seems a better vehicle for achieving this nar-
rowly tailored jurisdiction over church misconduct.) Further, tort liti-
99 CHARTER, supra note 5, art. 4.
90 See supra Part I.A.
91
 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
92 See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997) (discussing the need to have
safeguards when religious and state personnel work together).
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gation may be a far less intrusive form of state jurisdiction than, say,
even forms of generally applicable regulation. Successful tort litiga-
tion necessarily cuts into the life of a church, but the post-litigation
decisions regarding internal reforms that will prevent future harm
remain in the hands of the church.
Individualized agreements between dioceses and prosecutors also
are being used as measures to prevent sexual abuse of children. Some
agreements ensure that the diocese will notify civil authorities in the
event of any allegation of abuse. But others go further. In their
agreements with state authorities, the Diocese of Manchester, New
Hampshire and the Diocese of Phoenix, Arizona have accepted state
oversight of their compliance with their own child protection policies,
and have invited the state to shape those policies through review and
comment.93 The state obviously has much experience in the prosecu-
tion of child sexual abuse, can claim expertise in its prevention, and
rightly shares this expertise with any group seeking to establish poli-
cies. But state participation in the development of internal church
policies and state monitoring of church compliance with those poli-
cies does not comport with a "least intrusive alternative" requirement.
Further, it stands in marked contrast to the state's traditional role of
enacting a law, requiring a church to abide by that law, and monitor-
ing the church's compliance with that law.
9S Because the Manchester Diocese agreed that it could have been prosecuted under
the New Hampshire child endangerment statute, it entered into a "pre-indictment diver-
sion-from-prosecution agreement" with the New Hampshire Attorney General. See John S.
Baker, Jr., Prosecuting Dioceses and Bishops, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (2003). Pursuant to
this agreement, the diocese will provide to the Attorney General each year for five years
(and at other times when requested) copies of its child sexual abuse policies and proto-
cols, for the state's review and comment. The state will audit the diocese each year for five
years to ensure that it is in compliance with the terms of the agreement and with the di-
ocesan policies on child sexual abuse. The audits may involve the inspection of records
and interviews of diocesan personnel. Provision is made for the revision or amendment of
the terms of the agreement. See Hillsborough County Superior Court, In Re Grand Jury
Proceedings, No. 02-S-1154 (Dec. 10, 2002), available at
http://wwwstate.nh.us/uhdoj/Press%20Release /Diocese%20Final%20Agreement.pdf;
see also Kenny, supra note 4, at B3; News Release, Richard M. Romley, Maricopa County
Attorney, Six Priests Indicted: Bishop, Diocese Sign Agreement Insuring Protection of
Children, http://www.maricopacountyattorney.org/ Press/fullreleases.asp ( June 2, 2003)
(containing May 3, 2003 Agreement between State of Arizona, ex. rel. Richard M. Romley,
Maricopa County Attorney, Thomas J. O'Brien, Bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of
Phoenix, and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Phoenix, which provides that the Maricopa
County Attorney's Office and the public will have the opportunity to provide input" into
the diocese's sexual misconduct policy).
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Out of a desire to reestablish trust and cooperate with authori-
ties, other dioceses may want to enter into these types of agreements.
In doing so, such dioceses should avoid provisions that permit the
state to create or modify internal church policies and measure com-
pliance with such policies. Although provisions like these give the ap-
pearance of a church rigorously getting its house in order, they may
have the opposite effect because they place the church in a subordi-
nate and dependent relationship with the state. Such a relationship
makes it easy for a church, even in full compliance with the terms of
the agreement, to abdicate its own moral responsibility for substantive
internal reform. Permitting the state such a formative role in internal
church policies signals to the state that the church has no confidence
in its ability to address the crisis, and that the state can expect busi-
ness as usual and must, therefore, increase its vigilance over an insti-
tution that cannot be trusted. Such an abdication of responsibility for
self-governance effectively waives constitutional protections because it
invites continued state oversight and entanglement. Agreements with
state authorities, if used at all, should have as their primary goal a
church's compliance with state law, and should not put a church into
a kind of moral receivership under the supervision of the attorney
general or a state agency.
CONCLUSION
Now is a critical time for the Church to cultivate responsible
freedom. It enjoys broad freedom under the U.S. Constitution for
profound moral and institutional reform. And, as it acknowledges the
rightful jurisdiction of the state on matters of clergy sexual abuse of
minors, the Church can neither simply demand complete deference
to its internal decisions nor relinquish its task of moral renewal to the
state.
